More than three years after war erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s leadership has begun laying the groundwork for what it describes as a national political dialogue intended to shape the country’s post-war future. Whether that dialogue can bridge deep political divisions—or simply expose them further—remains one of Sudan’s most consequential unanswered questions.
In April 2026, Sovereignty Council Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announced plans to launch a comprehensive national dialogue as part of a broader roadmap toward restoring civilian governance and preparing for future elections.
As an initial confidence-building measure, Sudanese authorities permitted opposition figures living abroad to renew official identity documents, allowing many exiled politicians to return if they choose. The National Umma Party quickly began assisting members overseas with document renewals, a move widely viewed as an early signal that political engagement might become possible after years of conflict.
The initiative comes as Sudan’s security institutions—including the General Intelligence Service (GIS), headed by Lieutenant General Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal—continue efforts to stabilize areas recaptured from the RSF, combat organized crime, and restore state institutions. Government officials argue that lasting political dialogue will ultimately depend on both improved security and the rebuilding of public confidence after years of war.
Yet weeks after the announcement, tangible progress remains limited.
Political movements associated with the Taqaddum and Sumoud coalitions, both successors to elements of the former Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), have publicly stated that additional guarantees are necessary before they will participate. While some factions appear cautiously open to negotiations, others remain deeply skeptical.
The proposal has also generated strong opposition among segments of Sudan’s military establishment, allied armed movements, political organizations, media commentators, and civil society. Many believe the scale of violence since April 2023 has destroyed the trust necessary for meaningful reconciliation.
Supporters of the initiative, however, argue that Sudan can no longer afford indefinite political paralysis. They contend that the war has exhausted state institutions, weakened the economy, and displaced millions, making political dialogue an unavoidable step toward rebuilding the country.
Conditions for Dialogue
Ahmed Al-Dafina, chairman of the National Accord Forces (Watan), said his coalition supports the principle of dialogue but insists that any negotiations must be governed by clearly defined legal and political principles.
Among those conditions, he said, is accountability for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict. In his view, accountability should extend to all parties where evidence supports responsibility, including members of Sumoud, Ta’sis, and figures associated with the former National Congress Party.
Al-Dafina argued that both Sumoud and Ta’sis have experienced declining political influence and may now be more willing to participate as one political constituency among many rather than insisting on exclusive representation of Sudan’s political transition.
He described that shift as a significant change from earlier positions taken following the December Revolution.
Can Justice Be Negotiated?
International law scholar Dr. Mohamed Zain said any future agreement between the government and the RSF—or political groups allied with it—must be examined through three separate legal frameworks: Sudanese criminal law, international law, and the rights of victims.
According to Zain, Sudanese law does not permit political agreements to erase criminal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Such offenses are not subject to statutes of limitation and cannot simply be set aside through negotiated settlements.
He argued that victims and their families retain independent legal rights to seek accountability through Sudanese courts and, where jurisdiction exists, international judicial mechanisms.
Zain also maintained that political actors who openly supported the RSF could face varying degrees of legal responsibility depending on evidence demonstrating direct participation, facilitation, or material support for alleged violations.
Regarding international law, he noted that although Sudan never ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, the United Nations Security Council retains the authority to refer cases to the ICC, as it previously did in relation to Darfur.
He further observed that any negotiated settlement could provide a framework for ceasefire arrangements, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, transitional justice, and national reconciliation. However, he emphasized that such political agreements would not eliminate victims’ rights to truth, compensation, accountability, or legal remedy.
“Victims retain the right to justice, compensation, truth, and guarantees that such crimes will not be repeated,” Zain said. “No political agreement can fully erase international criminal responsibility.”
He added that meaningful reform of Sudan’s security institutions—including preserving a unified national military and preventing the emergence of parallel armed structures—will remain essential to securing any lasting peace.
Who Is the Government Negotiating With?
The Revolutionary Awakening Council, led by Sheikh Musa Hilal, questioned whether the proposed dialogue has a clearly defined negotiating partner.
Abdelrahman Hassan Saeed, the council’s secretary-general and a legal scholar, argued that any successful political process must first identify precisely who represents each side of the conflict.
“Who exactly is the government negotiating with?” he asked. “Is it the RSF, Ta’sis, Sumoud, Taqaddum, or external actors accused of supporting the conflict?”
According to Saeed, different actors have played different roles throughout the war, ranging from political advocacy and logistical support to direct military participation. He argued that negotiations cannot succeed unless those distinctions are clearly understood.
He also distinguished between RSF members who served within Sudan’s official security institutions before April 15, 2023, and foreign fighters whom he alleged joined the conflict afterward. In his view, only the former could reasonably be considered for future integration, demobilization, or reintegration programs.
Like many other observers, Saeed maintained that individuals responsible for documented crimes should remain subject to prosecution regardless of any broader political settlement.
A Fragmented Political Landscape
The National Umma Party has itself become increasingly divided, with competing factions aligning with Sumoud, Ta’sis, and pro-government political currents.
Its decision to facilitate document renewals for members living abroad was widely interpreted as a tentative indication that at least some elements remain open to dialogue.
Political observers say those internal divisions may ultimately weaken both Sumoud and Ta’sis while strengthening political groups aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Similar divisions have emerged within the Democratic Bloc.
Sources indicate that Sudan Liberation Movement leader Minni Arko Minnawi, together with Al-Tom Hajo, Dr. Omar Othman, and representatives of the Northern Track, support Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s initiative.
Other factions, including elements associated with the Justice and Equality Movement, continue to express reservations regarding both the objectives and potential consequences of the proposed talks.
Between Peace and Accountability
Sudan’s debate over political dialogue reflects a broader national dilemma confronting societies emerging from armed conflict: whether peace can be achieved without sacrificing justice, and whether reconciliation is possible before accountability.
For the government led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the proposed dialogue represents an attempt to move Sudan beyond years of devastating war while rebuilding state institutions and national stability. Whether the initiative succeeds will depend not only on political willingness, but also on security conditions, public confidence, and the ability of institutions—including the General Intelligence Service and other state bodies—to provide an environment in which meaningful political participation can occur.
The answers to those questions are likely to shape not only the prospects for peace, but the future direction of Sudan itself.
